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The development of the modern parliamentary based political system required the 
reform of the representation of estates and the transformation of the government so 
as the forums of publicity outside the Parliament. The voting right and the electoral 
system might be the most appropriate legal structures that support the social 
embeddedness of modern political systems. They constitute the bases for politics and 
may provide legitimacy to it. Two dimensions are vital in relation to elections: 1. 
where, the territorial dimension (geometrical aspect), 2. who, the social dimension 
(scope of political rights). Considering the geographical basis of elections, two main 
directions can be observed at the beginning of modern parliamentarianism: the 
British and the French. Three rival electoral systems existed in the constitutional 
states in the 19th century: egalitarian (democratic), elitist (liberal) and corporative 
(conservative). The democratic and the liberal way of thinking shared the idea of 
individual voting right. In this regard, they both differed from the corporative system. 
However, those who favored the concept of universal suffrage recognized voting 
right as a natural right of equal people; liberals derived the voting right from the 
state and not from the natural equality of men. Voting right was entitled only to 
property owners and the educated/cultivated (Besitz und Bildung) elites. 
Liberalism had been increasingly affecting the mindset of Hungarian politicians 
from the 1830’s. Hungarian history writing labels the two decades preceding 1848 
as the ‘Hungarian Reform Era’ because the era’s social, political and modernization 
efforts were inspired by liberal ideas. During this period, assemblies were regularly 
held (1830, 1832-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, and 1847-1848), where the liberal 
noble elite was demanding progressive reforms more and more loudly. Reformists 
truly gained considerable successes during the Reform Era, however, the discourse 
and debate on how to transform had even more significance. These debates enabled 
the Hungarian Assembly at the revolutionary spring of 1848 to approve substantial 
laws within only a month. 
This study provides an overview on the development of representative electoral 
legislation in Hungary. The scope of voting right was determined by the liberal 
                                                   
1 The preparation of the work was supported by the project of the National Research, Development 
and Innovation Office – NKFIH K 112 429, entitled “The identification and socio-historical analysis 
of the representatives of Hungarian Parliaments in the age of dualism”, and the first author’s 
research was supported by the grant EFOP-3.6.1-16-2016-00001 (“Complex improvement of 
research capacities and services at Eszterhazy Karoly University”). 







model in Hungary, whilst the geometric structure of elections linked fundamentally to 
the British model. However, the established electoral system was generating serious 
debates during the next decades. The scope of voting right and its spatial 
effectiveness were both highly criticized. Despite all criticism, the fundamental 
elements of the system remained unchanged in Hungary. Although it is true, that the 
Hungarian National Assembly approved the establishment of a new electoral law in 
1913– which, still did not recognize the institution of the universal, secret and free 
suffrage –, the forthcoming elections due to the eruption of the war was postponed in 
1915.  
This paper demonstrates the variety of techniques of power applied by the law-
makers when determining the basics of representation. As this paper also indicates, 
there were several reasons why the legislatures did not lean towards the extension of 
right. The parliamentary debates on the suffrage often brought to light the question 
of the nationalities. The ethnic mix of voters did not alter the ethnic mix of the 
inhabitants in the nationality areas of Hungary. The incongruous situation of the 
system arose from the fact that these nationality areas were the most reliable 
constituencies of the government. Therefore, the success of the politics of support for 
the compromise was chiefly built on the votes of nationality voters. The fragile 
mandate distributive system of both Transylvania and Hungary was threatened by 
the extension of suffrage, the transformation of constituencies and the equalization of 
the number of voters behind the mandates.  
 
Keywords: political system, Parliament, electoral system, universal suffrage 
 
 
The development of the modern parliamentary based political system required 
the reform of the representation of estates and the transformation of the government 
so as the forums of publicity outside the Parliament. The voting right and the 
electoral system might be the most appropriate legal structures that support the 
social embeddedness of modern political systems. They constitute the bases for 
politics and may provide legitimacy to it. They provide, to be more exact, its legal 
frames because several other political and cultural elements play significant roles in 
political decision-making.2 Two dimensions are vital in relation to elections: 1. 
where, the territorial dimension (geometrical aspect), 2. who, the social dimension 
(scope of political rights). Considering the geographical basis of elections, two main 
directions can be observed at the beginning of modern parliamentarianism: the 
British and the French. The suffrage and the electoral system had been determined 
the stages of British parliamentarianism since the 15th century. The members of the 
British Parliament were representatives of communities (counties, boroughs) and 
voting rights were bound to property and/or turnover tax. In contrast, in France 
where the Revolution made a serious impact, constituencies were created on the 
                                                   
2 Thomas Kühne, Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur in Preußen 1867-1914. Landtagswahlen 
zwischen korporativer Tradition und politischem Massenmarkt (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1994), 34-37. 





basis of population density by neglecting historical traditions. The elected 
representatives were considered as representatives of the nation as a whole, and not 
as envoys of a district.3 The second dimension: who were included in the electoral 
roll, also had an important role. The Age of Enlightenment impacted deeply the 
development of civil rights and all adult males who were their own masters and 
property owners entitled to hold political capacity regardless of birth. Three rival 
electoral systems existed in the constitutional states in the 19th century: egalitarian 
(democratic), elitist (liberal) and corporative (conservative). The democratic and the 
liberal way of thinking shared the idea of individual voting right. In this regard, 
they both differed from the corporative system. However, those who favored the 
concept of universal suffrage recognized voting right as a natural right of equal 
people; liberals derived the voting right from the state and not from the natural 
equality of men. Voting right was entitled only to property owners and the 
educated/cultivated (Besitz und Bildung) elites.4  
These processes outlined above also impacted Hungary. Liberalism had been 
increasingly affecting the mindset of Hungarian politicians from the 1830’s. 
Hungarian history writing labels the two decades preceding 1848 as the ‘Hungarian 
Reform Era’ because the era’s social, political and modernization efforts were 
inspired by liberal ideas. During this period, assemblies were regularly held (1830, 
1832-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, and 1847-1848), where the liberal noble elite 
was demanding progressive reforms more and more loudly. Reformists truly gained 
considerable successes during the Reform Era, however, the discourse and debate 
on how to transform had even more significance. These debates enabled the 
Hungarian Assembly at the revolutionary spring of 1848 to approve substantial laws 
within only a month.5 This study provides an overview on the development of 
representative electoral legislation in Hungary. The scope of voting right was 
determined by the liberal model in Hungary, whilst the geometric structure of 
elections linked fundamentally to the British model. However, the established 
electoral system was generating serious debates during the next decades. The scope 
of voting right and its spatial effectiveness were both highly criticized. Despite all 
criticism, the fundamental elements of the system remained unchanged in Hungary. 
Although it is true, that the Hungarian National Assembly approved the 
establishment of a new electoral law in 1913 – which, still did not recognize the 
institution of the universal, secret and free suffrage –, the forthcoming elections due 
to the eruption of the war was postponed in 1915. This paper demonstrates the 
                                                   
3 Birgitta Bader-Zaar, “Die ‘grande affaire’ - Wahlrechtsreformen in Europa und Nordamerika im 
‘langen’ 19. Jahrhundert,” in Hunderst Jahre allgemeines und gleiches Wahlrecht in Österreich. 
Modernes Wahlrecht unter den Bedingungen eines Vielvölkerstaates, ed. Thomas Simon (Frankfurt 
am Main/Berlin: Peter Lang, 2010), 14-15. 
4 Kühne, Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur in Preußen 1867-1914, 383-386.  
5 About this period in general, see: Fónagy Zoltán, “Die Reformzeit,” in Geschicte Ungarns, ed. Tóth 






variety of techniques of power applied by the law-makers when determining the 
basics of representation. As this paper also indicates, there were several reasons 
why the legislatures did not lean towards the extension of right.  
Hungary was in a very special situation in the middle of the 19th century. The 
unified Hungary dreamed up by liberal nationalism had not existed yet, because 
Hungary was governed separately from the Principality of Transylvania and the 
status of the Croatia was also uncertain. Transylvania and Hungary both had their 
own institutions and legislations. The concept of the union of the two countries was 
becoming a more and more popular demand among the Hungarian elites during the 
1930s and 1940s. The idea of unification had not been welcomed by the 
Transylvanian protestant Hungarians and Szeklers in the 18th century because of its 
re-Catholization character. This attitude, however, commenced to change by the end 
of the 18th century. The idea of the union turned to become a vital issue for the 
Hungarian politics who considered Transylvania as one of the cradles of the 
Hungarian culture. The Transylvanian Hungarians and Szeklers, who constituted 
only the 30% of the population of Transylvania, also realized that in order to 
reserve their leading position in the area they should unify Hungary. The status of 
Transylvania was a cardinal issue for the Hungarians of the time because they 
thought that without the union Transylvania would be under Romanian domination. 
This Daco-Romania, supported by the Pan-Slavic Saint-Petersburg, would 
fundamentally threaten the integrity of the Habsburg Monarchy and weaken the 
process of the Western type of embourgeoisement.6 The Hungarian and 
Transylvanian liberal nobility tried to establish a unified and modern civic state, 
eradicate legal inequalities among the citizens and dismiss the estate system by 
preserving the leadership for the Hungarian political elite. For this purpose, they 
could apply the instrument of both the electoral geometry and the electoral 
legislation.  
 
I. The antecedents of the electoral reform in the Reform Era. The urban 
question 
The Hungarian National Assembly had already comprised of two houses before 
1848. The members entitled to the upper house were mainly hereditary peers, who 
constituted the Hungarian aristocracy (counts, barons, dukes). Their personal 
presence in the Assembly lasted until an economic census was implemented in 
1885. The upper house was also made up of the bishops, archbishops of the Roman 
Catholic Church, so as the head officers of the state. Plenary sessions were headed 
by the substitute of the king, the palatine. The members of the lower house were the 
envoys of the county nobility, the free royal cities, the free districts and the 
delegates of the Catholic Church. The sessions were conducted by the 
                                                   
6 About this question in details, see: Pál Judit, Unió vagy „unificáltatás”? Erdély uniója és a királyi 
biztos működése (1867-1872) (Kolozsvár: Erdélyi Múzeum-Egyesület, 2010), 30-52. 





representative of the king (personalis regiae). All legislation had to be passed by 
both houses and the emperor. Vote counting was introduced in the procedure of 
decision-making in 1825. Consequently, cities and Catholic representatives had one 
vote each in the lower house. Envoys did not have sovereign decision-making 
rights, thus they had to vote as they were instructed by their represented 
community. Assemblies were held every 3 years, however, there were certain times 
when sessions extended over several years or the Parliament was not convened at 
all (1812-1825). Croatia held a different status by owning local legislation 
autonomy. The provincial assembly (sabor) was conducted by the Ban of Croatia. 
The Assembly of Transylvania was a unicameral representative body for the ‘three 
estate nationals’, the Hungarians, the Szeklers and the Saxons. The emperor who 
also held the title of the Prince of Transylvania could invite unlimited number of his 
trusted men (regalists) in order to secure his majority. All the laws were adopted by 
the Prince together with the Assembly.  
The voting right of the cities was a crucial issue in the plenary sessions during 
the Reform Era. The leaders of the Reform Era politicians considered that the inner 
structures of the cities did not affect the status of the nobility in the county, so 
notables could be convinced to back the transformation of the urban electoral 
system. This would have been the first step towards the reform of the representative 
system.  
To achieve a better understanding of the complexity of the problem, it is crucial 
to discuss briefly the status of the cities in the beginning of the 19th century. The 
privileged royal cities had gained their special rights in the Medieval Times or Early 
Modern Times but they lose their economic weight (with certain exceptions) by the 
19th century. The citizens of these cities were involved in corporations, which 
means, they became rather benefactors than opponents (as in the case of Western-
Europe) of the pre-capitalist estate system. For this reason, the Reform-wing liberal 
nobility could not politically rely on them. There was another problem with the 
cities: most of the inhabitants were with German and Slovak origin, so their role in 
the Hungarian nation-building was also highly questionable for the Hungarian 
liberal movement. However, the market town was another element of the settlement 
network, which, considering its function, was closer to the definition of a city. 
Market towns were under the authority of landlords and they were located chiefly in 
Hungarian populated areas. Their more favorable locations enabled them to actively 
enter to the development of modern economy, consequently, they were prosperous 
settlements. Their main profile was agriculture with effective market access, but the 
most significant ones also functioned as regional centers for markets. The 






because basically they were serfs. Their social status and Hungarian ethnicity made 
them perfect allies of the liberals.7 
The voting right of the cities gained a curial character from the plenary sessions 
of 1825-27, which means, that all the represented settlements together had only one 
vote per counties in the lower house of the Assembly.8 In parallel with the 
transition, the procedure of vote counting appeared and inevitably changed the 
decision-making mechanism of the Diet (per share voting formerly had been a rare 
procedure).9 Hence, the radical reduction of the number of urban (ecclesiastic) votes 
and the introduction of vote counting were parallel processes.  
After the reduction it became obvious that cities require more votes, however, as 
a requirement for this, it seemed urgent for the county nobility to transform the 
structure of the royal cities.10 Failing that, the narrow group of urban electors were 
considered to be oligarchic and unreliable from the ‘national’ aspect. These electors 
found unsuitable to be represented to the same degree as the county nobility in the 
Diet.11  
Before the revolutionary change, the question of city reform was one of the 
central agendas in the Assembly of 1843-44. The Centralists12 argued that a 
complete conversion of legislation was necessary, in which cities would have 
gained a key position related to representation.13 However, the opinion of the 
majority of the opposition was better articulated by Móricz Szentkirályi.14 
Szentkirályi’s proposal was still not good enough for the free royal cities who 
issued their own motion. Both the content of Szentkirályi’s idea and the motion of 
the cities vary, yet, they agreed on the importance of the extension of civil rights. 
The increase of proportion of voting rights in the Diet would have been only 
                                                   
7 Czoch Gábor, “The question of urban citizens’ national identity in mid-nineteenth century Hungary,” 
East Central Europe 33/1-2 (2006), 123-127. 
8 Antal Tamás, Város és népképviselet. Az 1848. év: XXIII. tc. és intézményei Debrecenben (1848–
1872) (Szeged: Pólay Elemér Alapítvány, 2011), 15. 
9 Szíjártó M. István, A Diéta. A magyar rendek és az országgyűlés 1708–1792 (Keszthely: Balaton 
Akadémia Kiadó, 2010), 296. 
10 Antal, Város és népképviselet, 16.; Czoch Gábor, “A reformkori urbanizáció és a polgárság 
megítélésének kérdései,” in: „A városok szíverek” Tanulmányok Kassáról és a reformkori 
városokról, ed. Czoch Gábor (Pozsony: Kalligram, 2009), 26., About the national requirements to 
cities and its relationship with politics, see: Czoch, A reformkori urbanizáció, 28-39., Czoch, The 
question of urban citizens’, 130-139.  
11 Czoch Gábor, “Kassa polgársága a 19. század első felében,” Limes 11/2-3 (1998), 69. 
12 The Centralists were the members of a narrow liberal political group, which aimed to establish a 
centralist state following the French model. They wanted to reduce the power of counties and to 
increase the role of the central government and the settlements. They also wanted to place a 
government responsible to a unified representative parliament.  
13 Jean Bérenger, Kecskeméti Károly, Országgyűlés és parlamenti élet Magyarországon 1608-1918 
(Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 2008), 264-265. 
14 About the content of the proposal, see: Kajtár István, Magyar városi önkormányzatok (1848-1918) 
(Budapest: Akadémia Kiadó, 1992), 36-41. 





possible if more citizens had gained voting rights. The envoys of the cities 
formulated their proposal much more rigorously on the extension of rights. In 
opposition of Szentkirályi’s document, they would have excluded the Jewish 
population from granting civil rights. The envoys had a narrower interpretation on 
the extension of civil rights and they intended to keep the new citizens more closely 
to the city. Their intention was to preserve the traditional urban community.15  
The authors of these proposals articulated two opposing assessments about the 
city. The envoys of the nobility underlined the importance of the settlement’s 
number of population and economic, trading and cultural significance. They 
considered the Hungarian settlement network of the age through the lens of 
functionality. In contrast to that, cities considered the group of citizens with civil 
rights relevant in assessing the settlements’ significance.16 This group of citizens 
were recognized as a free and impeccable community. During the plenary sessions 
of the Assembly, cities were also challenged from a national aspect. The ethnic-
linguistic nationalism had already dominated the Diet and, consequently, the 
Hungarian nobilities tried to impose their idea of a nation on the German-speaking 
inhabitants of the cities. In some plenary speeches, cities were even accused of not 
belonging to the Hungarian nation.17  
In the middle of the 1840’s, one of the possible political resolutions of this 
conflict was to involve wider groups of inhabitants of the cities into the political 
life. For that, two possible options existed: the rationalization of the position of 
cities in the assembly and the transformation of the groups of represented 
settlements.  
The debate about the cities was continued during the last Diet of 1847-48, which 
was, understandably, ceased by the March of 1848. At the opening of the first 
session, the government introduced a proposal with 170 clauses,18 however, the 
estates commenced to formulate their own draft, which was negotiated on 18 
January 1848. They intended to legislate both the reform of the cities and the 
position of the urban envoys in the Assembly. In that regard, the draft addressed 
both settlement regulations and parliamentarian issues as well.19  
                                                   
15 Czoch, Kassa polgársága, 69-70; We do not have exact data about the proportion of the citizens 
within the population of cities, hence, we do not know precisely the number of the total urban 
population as well. However, the 2-3% of the population of Pest was made up of citizens, 5-6% in 
Pozsony, Kassa, Győr and 11% in Debrecen in the first half of the 19th century. Tóth Árpád, 
“Polgárfelvételi stratégiák és a polgári cím vonzereje Pozsonyban a 19. század első felében,” in: 
Urbs. Magyar várostörténeti évkönyv I (Budapest, 2006), 245. 
16 About the debate, see: Coch, Kassa polgársága, 71-72. 
17 Czoch Gábor, “Nemzetfelfogások a városi kérdés reformkori vitáiban,” in: Társadalomtörténeti 
tanulmányok Tóth Zoltán emlékére, ed. Horváth Zita and Rada János, (Miskolc: Miskolci Egyetemi 
Kiadó, 2017), 170.  
18 Antal, Város és népképviselet, 18.  






The article, however, was removed from the agenda because of the events of the 
revolution. Then, the April Laws legislated these two problematic issues separately: 
the question of voting rights and the city envoys was regulated by the representative 
assembly; and the structural reform of the cities was covered by the Urban Law. 
Thus, smaller steps toward the total transformation of the system was no longer 
needed because of the European revolutionary decade.  
 
II. The Electoral Laws of 1848 
Other studies on parliamentarism deem the emergence of electoral reforms to be 
a turning point in the constitutional development.20 The political impact of the 
reforms on the composition of the political elite is also widely argued. In the case of 
Hungary, the laws of 1848 are the only regulations that can be rationally assessed 
because, on the one hand, they remained in force during the whole Era of Dualism 
and, on the other hand, they were generally unaffected by the regulations of 1868, 
1874 and 1899.  
The liberal politicians of the Hungarian National Assembly of 1848 were able to 
formulate high-impact laws in the lower house that determined the mechanism of 
the Hungarian civic state even after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. 
The voting right was directly legislated by Act V of 1848. However, it seems 
important to note that the Hungarian laws were not automatically applicable for 
Transylvania.  The Act VII did state the reincorporation of Transylvania, but it 
should also have been adopted by the Assembly of Transylvania. The Hungarian 
politicians insisted that the assembly of the estates in Transylvania should vote on 
the issue of the union. The nationalities, however, aimed to transform, first, the 
country’s representation system. The main reason for this opposition can be found 
in the composition of the assembly: the Hungarians and the Szeklers were in 
majority to the detriment of the Saxons (Romanians did not belong to the nations). 
The Transylvanian assembly started the sessions on 30 May and after the approval 
of the Act of Union, it legislated the procedure of representative elections. The 
emperor signed the Transylvanian laws on 10 June. Pursuant to the Act of Union, 
Transylvania should have adopted the Hungarian electoral legislation, but it did not 
happen. The reasons for that will be discussed later. Now, let me focus on the 
electoral system due to the census categories, first.   
 
Voting right of the estate voters, the so-called ‘old right’ 
Both the Hungarian Act V and the Transylvanian Act II contained certain 
inclusions that ensured the former voting right holders that they would also keep 
their right in the representative system regardless of whether they meet the criteria 
                                                   
20 Ralph Melville, Adel und Revolution in Böhmen. Strukturwandel von Herrschaft und Gesellschaft in 
Österreich um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Mainz: von Zabern, 1998), 231. 





of censuses, or not.21 This category of suffrage was labeled as voting on the basis of 
the old right. Numerous speeches were addressed to change the general framework 
of this proposal during the last Diet of Estates. For instance, Ferenc Kubinyi along 
with László Madarász intended to grant the same rights for the non-nobles as 
enjoyed by the nobles. They would have quit the census criteria issued in Article 2, 
which means that, this proposal basically would have provided a universal voting 
right for all males. On the contrary, János Barkóczy argued at the upper house that 
if the extension of rights had been brought through applying the American model, 
‘statistically, that would have resulted in a varied combination of ethnicities. 
Among the 377 envoys there would be only 130 Hungarians and the rest of them 
would be non-Hungarian speakers but Slovaks, Illyrians, Romanians, German and 
other nationalities.’22 In this argument, the criticism of the time on the electoral 
reforms of the Dualist Era had already emerged. The extension of civil rights was 
most frequently rejected because it would have resulted in the profound nationality 
transformation of the political elite. The majority of the Diet finally adopted the 
general application of the ‘old right’ and the regulation of the new electoral groups 
by censuses. However, the ‘old right’ could not be inherited anymore. Pursuant to 
Act II Article 4, those who had held voting right in accordance with Act XII of 
1792 in Transylvania (Counties, Land of Fogaras and the Szekler sees) gained the 
right to vote again (even if their right had been restricted in the past).23 This differed 
from the content of the Hungarian legislation. The main question was whether the 
Szekler gentries could be considered as nobles, or not. If they were recognized as 
nobles, they had the right to vote in the representative system. The collective 
privilege of the Szeklers had already existed in the Middle-Ages, however, their 
legal status was changed by the end of the 17th century. John II Sigismund 
eliminated the collective nobility right of the Szeklers at the sitting of the assembly 
of Segesvár in 1562. Then, the Szekler nobility title could only be held by the 
‘primors’ (chief nobles). The members of this class became the owners of those 
who had already lived in their lands, and the Szekler common people, or in other 
words, the Szekler free people, became the serfs of the Prince.24 The common 
people, then, regained their freedom in the 17th century. Zsigmond Báthory restored 
the old freedom and rights of the Szekler people in his patent in Déva in 31 
December 1601. The liberated Szeklers were called as ‘libertinus’.25 However, the 
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charters in the beginning of 17th century only recognized the primors as nobles. So, 
the common Szeklers lost their privileges during the 17th century. Hence, the 
collective freedom of Act II granted the right to vote to all Szeklers regardless of 
past regulations. Consequently, the Szeklers belonged to the category of voters of 
the ‘old right’ and this procedure was highly represented in Transylvania.  
The Hungarian Act V Article 2 provided new legislation for the cities. Pursuant 
of this Act Clause a., voting right were granted to those ‘who had been urban 
citizens, even if they could not meet criteria in the above mentioned clauses.’26 This 
clause, however, was only addressed to inhabitants with full civil rights of the royal 
free cities. The interpretation of the Act V Article 2 was far from coherent because 
market-towns also applied this right for registered ‘citizens’ of the town. This 
phenomenon is known to the Hungarian social-history. The emptiness of citizenship 
as a legal category in accordance with the separation of functional cities and the 
group of royal free cities provides an understanding for this practice. Among many 
others, Vera Bácskai also highlighted that the adjective citizen detached from the 
inhabitants of the royal free cities during the first decades of the 19th century. The 
inhabitants of market-towns with broader municipal rights often made themselves 
known as citizens and these towns even issued citizen recruitment procedures (e.g. 
Szombathely, Pápa, Nagykanizsa) similar to the procedures of royal free cities. 
Vera Bácskai linked the development of non-legal citizen awareness to the renewal 
of the term, which lead us from the social group of the estate era to the modern 
social-historical category of citizens. In the electoral register of 1848, the category 
of the ‘old right’ was incorrectly but not inconsistently applied because this 
category prolonged the validity of the April Laws.27 The former citizens managed to 
preserve their influence in the royal free cities by applying the ‘old right’ so they 
were not forced to meet the criteria of the censuses.28 This phenomenon might seem 
to contradict the above mentioned argument on the royal free cities but this issue 
will be covered later in relation with the electoral geometry.  
 
New voters, property, income and education 
Pursuant to Act V Article 2 Clause a. the group of voters on the basis of property 
were defined. According to this Act, urban voters must have been in possession of a 
mansion of a value of 300 silver forints, whilst, the inhabitants of villages must 
have been in possession of a ¼ part of ‘serf-plot’.29 Assets of spouses and minors 
also counted in addition to the property of the males but rented lands did not count. 
This quantity of property was considered as the criterion of economic 
independence. The exact amount of the ¼ land depended on the local conditions: it 
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was smaller in the case of a better quality soil and larger in the case of a poorer 
quality soil. The value of urban houses was also significantly affected by market 
conditions.  
The Transylvanian Act again differed from the Hungarian one. This difference 
did not appear in the case of the cities because a mansion or a land of the value of 
300 forints was also the requirement. In the case of the villages, however, not the 
size of the lot but the amount of taxes annually paid on the lands was the criterion.30 
The Hungarian politicians had already formulated their final proposal on the 
electoral law before the beginning of the assembly sittings.31 The debate was mainly 
about whether they should delegate envoys of the current assembly to Hungary, or 
make a new electoral law and hold representative elections throughout the country 
for the subsequent national assembly to be held in Pest.32 Miklós Wesselényi, one of 
the leading figures of the Hungarian liberal nobles in Transylvania, warned his 
fellow-representatives that the new electoral law might enable the counties and the 
Saxon sees to delegate Romanian representatives to Pest. According to his proposal, 
this procedure would not be beneficial because of the intensifying nationality 
conflict.33 Hence, the issue of voting right and the nationality question were closely 
linked to each other. The Transylvanian politicians agreed on the inapplicability of 
the Hungarian property census mainly because of the different land structure of the 
country, so instead of this regulation, they adopted the tax census.  Károly Szász, 
the envoy of Vízakna and the professor of the Lyceum of Nagyenyed argued that 5 
forints should be the minimum amount of the tax census. However, the session of 
31 May adopted a higher value of 8 forints as the minimum standard. The 
inhabitants of villages who could not afford to pay even the minimum amount 
gained the opportunity of indirect representation. Settlements with less than 100 
households gained the right to elect one elector and settlements with more than 100 
households gained the right to elect two electors.34 The envoys expressed 
themselves in favor of the draft, which had already been approved during the 
preliminary discussions, and they submitted this draft to the Emperor for signature 
on 2 June.  
Both the Hungarian and the Transylvanian Act legislated the voting right of 
‘craftsmen, merchants and factory owners’ in the same way: among them, those 
could gain the right, who settled in the particular town, owned a workshop, yard or 
factory there and worked with at least two assistants. In this category, income did 
not matter, but those who earned annually more than 100 forints on the basis of land 
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or capital also became voters. The intellectuals were granted the right to vote 
regardless of their income. The education system was not coherent yet, so not the 
acknowledged levels of degree but the concrete occupations were listed in the Act.  
As it came to another general restriction, the voting right was only granted to 
males over the age of 20. Further distinctions were made in regards to place of birth 
(must be Hungarian-born or naturalized), competence (who were not under 
guardianship) and record of compliance (no criminal convictions). The Hungarian 
regulation made a distinction between an active and a passive voting right. There 
were two reasons for that: first, only males of 24 could stand as candidates in 
elections, so people between the ages of 20-24, who met the general census and 
became voters, could not be elected; second, electability was authorized on 
condition of the use of Hungarian language.35 This legislation was justified by Act II 
of 1848, which declared the Hungarian language as the language of the state, so the 
people of Hungary could only be represented at the assembly by Hungarian-
speakers.  
Another important restriction was that only the members of the established 
denominations gained the right to vote. Primarily, this regulation adversely affected 
the Hungarian and Transylvanian Jewish population. The often mentioned reason 
for excluding them from politics was the Anti-Semite protests of March. Although 
the liberal leaders welcomed the Jewish emancipation, they did not found opportune 
to continue the process and the extension of full civil rights at the time. Since there 
was an ongoing tension between the Christian majority population of towns and the 
Jewish inhabitants, who had been resettled only after 1840. The chief politicians 
considered the steps towards a further extension of rights, which might have caused 
some negative consequences, too early.36  
It is worth mentioning that conditions of local voting right was different to the 
national one. Pursuant to Act XVIII, the towns had distinct local electoral 
regulations and distinct conditions of censuses. The towns were divided into four 
categories on the basis of the number of population: 1. under 12000 people, small 
town; 2. between 12 – 30000 people, medium-sized town; 3. over 30000 people, 
city; 4. and Pest.37 The voting right was differentiated among these categories. This 
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Table 1. The provincial and parliamentarian census of cities on the basis of the 
applicable regulations (1848-1871) 
 
Electability was not regulated that strictly. The only criterion was the local 
residency.  The right to vote for the members of the local municipality was stricter, 
consequently, the leadership of the cities remained in the hands of the old elite. This 
legislation can be viewed as a special compromise, because the transition to 
representative system broadened the base of the newly elected liberal government in 
the assembly – as it will be discussed below, new Hungarian settlements were 
included and royal free towns mostly populated by German-speakers were dropped 
out – and, at the same time, ensured the local authority of the citizens of the old 
estate system (until 1871).38  
The cities – in contrast to the counties – were going through a representative 
transition and they were required to launch an election for the renewal of officials. 
This distinction was not a coincidence at all, because the politicians of the 
governing party, members of the former opposition, did not consider timely or 
likely to reduce the influence of the gentries, who had gained political power in the 
Reform Era, whilst, they insisted that city council officers, who had been elected by 
a restricted group of citizens, had to be replaced.  Hence, the liberal political views 
of the gentry was poorly supported by the conservative urban elites. So, this 
situation had to be changed. However, the transformation of county municipalities 
into representative bodies raised the issue that nationalities might take the power 
over the counties. Partly, because of this threat, Lajos Kossuth, who demanded the 
                                                   
38 Czoch Gábor, “Városi tisztújítás Kassán,” Századok 149 no. 5. (2015): 1031–103.; According to the 
estimation of István Kajtár, only the 70-75% of the population of free royal cities entitled to vote in 
parliamentary elections had the right to vote in local elections. Kajtár, Magyar városi 
önkormányzatok, 50.  
 
 Town Large 
town 
City Pest Parliamentarian 
census  
Old Right Equal legislation 
Property (one-year 
ownership, except for 
inheritance) 













(on the basis of paid rent, 
one-year residency) 






transition of counties to a representative system, remained to be a lone voice among 
his fellow ministers by April 1848.39   
Supposedly, the 4,8% of the population (92.500 people) gained the right to vote 
and only 17-18% of them counted as new voters in Transylvania. Precise data on 
Hungary are not available but as it presented in the academic literature, the voters 
accounted for the 5,7% of the total population. There were 470. 000 new voters 
besides the 130.000 voters of the old right.40 These numbers basically implicate that 
the ¼ of the males over the age 20 became voters, which was an enormous increase 
at the national level and, in comparison with Europe, it met the requirements of the 
times.41  
 
The structure of constituencies, the geometry of elections 
The voters could autonomously exercise their right to vote. Since the Hungarian 
representative system did not apply the institution of electoral colleges – unlike the 
rest of the Monarchy –, the results of the elections were depended on the 
constituency boundaries. Thus, the number of population of these territorial units 
varied. The Hungarian laws – following the legislatures’ interests – partly relied on 
the inherited structure, as they divided the counties into 2 districts, which was 
exactly the same practice of the former estate representation. So, the political 
environment of the nobility changed but they did not lose their former influence in 
1848. In the case of the cities, the number of the population was taken into 
consideration and the same logic was followed when a given county was divided 
into more than two districts. The mandates were attached to the number of 
population: in bigger cities 15-20.000 people, and in smaller ones (in the 
countryside) 30.000 people constituted one parliamentary seat.42 In the newly 
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modified urban constituencies, the average rate of the population was 17.243 
people, which implied that the assembly did not depart from the foundations, which 
had already laid down. All village constituencies – except for five – were at the 
range of 13.000 and 23.000 people. All the settlements that did not fit in that scale 
had less than 10.000 inhabitants, and 18 of them did not even had 5.000 residents.43  
The group of representative cities radically transformed, and this formerly German-
oriented category turned to be indicative of Hungarian ethnic domination.44 
Again, the number and distribution of the Transylvanian representatives differed 
from the Hungarian enactment. Pursuant to Act 5 of 1848, the Hungarian National 
Assembly granted 2-2 mandates to each counties, sees and other territories in 
Transylvania. The group of cities featuring in the Transylvanian assembly were not 
modified, since they were the ethnic base of the Hungarian and the Szekler 
population. All royal free towns gained 2-2, while others 1-1 mandates. The Saxon 
cities could only delegate envoys together with their sees and regions, but they 
could not form a delegation on their own. All together 69 seats were appointed for 
Transylvania.  
Before the opening of the subsequent Transylvanian assembly, negotiations on 
this subject had already begun on 28 May. Dénes Kemény, State Secretary for 
Domestic Affairs, read out the Act, which had previously drafted by the Hungarian 
National Assembly. The discussion showed that the number of the seats were 
miscalculated in Pozsony, so Transylvania finally gained 73 instead of 69 
mandates.45  
Both the Hungarian and the Transylvanian assemblies failed to adjust the 
constituencies of the Transylvanian counties, sees and cities to the number of 
population. This distribution seemed to be disproportionate and it was required a 
correction, which was carried out only during the Dualism. The modification of the 
districts required the reform of the total public administrative system, so the final 
resolution came late because the proposal was being debated during three 
parliamentary cycles after the Compromise.  
 
II. Parliamentary debates on the composition of the electorate and the 
distribution of constituencies. The amendment of  Act of 1848 (1874,1877) 
After the Compromise, the Israelites theoretically gained the right to vote 
according to Article 17 of 1867. The Hungarian assembly thoroughly addressed 
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both the issue of the number of electorate and the anomalies occurred in the 
distribution of constituencies during the debate on the new electoral regulations of 
Act XXXIII of 1874. The new distribution of the constituencies in the newly 
restructured counties was also discussed on the basis of Act X of 1877. The main 
issues of these debates will be covered in this part.  
 
The debate on the electoral bill of 1874, changes to the electoral system 
The assembly commenced to discuss the new electoral law in July 1874.46 The 
general dispute on the electoral draft was opened by Count Gyula Szapáry, the 
Minister of Interior. In his speech Szapáry emphasized that the government had not 
intended to broaden the group of electorate because it could have been dangerous 
and, simply, it had not been necessary at all.  He argued that “no one could accuse 
us of being harmful to the foreign language speaker nationalities, but we should not 
forget about our own interests; there are boundaries and limits, which cannot be 
crossed because that would be a crime against our own nation.” So, the electoral 
right was linked to the nationality question right at the beginning of the debate.  
Szapáry found reasonable to discuss the conditions of Transylvania separately from 
Hungary due to the different property and financial conditions.47  
Lajos Mocsáry, from the opposition, replied to the speech of the Minister. He 
argued that the introduction of universal suffrage was necessary and the restriction 
of suffrage would not prevent the disintegration of Hungary. He pointed out that the 
ethnic electorate had already populated most of the constituencies and by 
introducing the universal suffrage, only the number of voters would increase and 
the ethnic composition of the constituencies would remain unchanged. Mocsáry 
also considered inevitable to modify the distribution of constituencies. According to 
his argument, the Transylvanian conditions were simply scandalous because in 
certain constituencies, 250.00 inhabitants were counted as one mandate, whilst, in 
the cities, several thousand inhabitants were also counted as one mandate. Mocsáry 
pointed out that one should own 36 acres land to get the right to vote in 
Transylvania due to the draft. He was also against that the former nobility would 
preserve its privilege to vote. Mocsáry, in the name of the opposition, did not intend 
to amend the legislation of 1848, instead, he was in favor of making a new electoral 
law.48  
Mihail Polit (Polit Mihály), representative of Pancsova (Pančevo), also joined 
the argument of the opposition. Polit expected the extension of rights to make the 
country more stable: “over time, Hungary will be transformed from an ethnic-
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national state to a multi-ethnic one. Hungary, over time and I am saying over time, 
will become the ‘Switzerland of the East’, or it will be dissolved’. He also drew 
attention to the anomalies existing in the Military Frontier, where, in contrast to the 
situation of Transylvania, the size of the constituencies was too big. He further 
intended to extend the suffrage and increase the number of constituencies in the 
Southern Territories. He ended his speech with a bold turn of phrase: “if this issue 
is on table, we Serbians will say: we shall see each other. Bei Philippi sehen wir uns 
vieder (I shall see thee in Philippi)”. These lines made big waves throughout the 
assembly. The reference to Philippi meant the forthcoming nationality debate of the 
subsequent sessions in the following days.49   
Kálmán Tisza (who was still a politician of the opposition but, at the same time, 
he was preparing for becoming the head of the next government) also contributed to 
the argument. Tisza adopted the draft and rejected the idea of universal suffrage. “In 
my opinion, the universal suffrage does not do any harm to the state unless the 
conditions are given. But if it is adopted without achieving adequate and stable 
social conditions, it will be harmful to freedom.” – summarized his speech. Tisza 
rejected both the criticism of both Mocsáry and Polit and clarified that the draft had 
not been made against the nationalities. He accused Mocsáry of contributing to the 
nationality agitation as a representative of Hungarian origin. Tisza concluded that 
there had been a great threat on the Hungarian political nation inside and outside the 
country. He refused the idea of an “Eastern Switzerland” with the reason that it 
would not be Hungary anymore but Switzerland, so Polit here questioned the 
rationale of Hungary. The draft was found suitable for further discussion on 7 July 
1874, consequently, the idea of universal suffrage was discarded.50  
During the thorough discussion of the draft, the question of the ‘old law’ 
generated a fierce debate. Balázs Orbán, a Szekler politician, took the floor in the 
beginning of the discussion to speak against the negative effects on the Szeklers of 
the ‘old law’ of Article 2. Based on the recital attached to the electoral draft, he 
considered that – later it turned out that he misinterpreted the draft – the 
government intended to take the suffrage away from the common Szeklers. Orbán 
argued peculiarly that all prerogatives were undue advantages, but providing 
suffrage for the Szeklers was not a privilege but a democratic demand.  However, 
he rejected the idea of universal suffrage by claiming that “the millions of people” 
still needed to learn constitutionalism. The Szeklers were different because “they 
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had always used their votes in favor of the Fatherland and they would not abuse this 
prerogative in the future, as well.” He required separate consideration for 
Szeklerland and for the Szeklers, and he did not derive their universal suffrage from 
the privileges of the estates but from a higher degree of a political-cultural 
integrity.51 Orbán’s statements were severely criticized by Saxon and Romanian 
representatives. The Szeklers finally gained their old prerogative, however, the ‘old 
right’ should have been clarified. According to the new legislation, who had been 
entered on electoral rolls until 1872, they obtained the right to vote. Thus, in fact, 
all nobles obtained it who were born before 1848. 
The other main issue was the real estate-based suffrage. Hence, the value of the 
real estate could not be measured reliably.  The draft indicated the minimum value 
as a house with three suites. The opposition urban representatives protested against 
the proposal presented by the government but, ultimately, they could not achieve 
any amendments to it.   
A much more important point was the land-based suffrage as it concerned the 
60% of all voters. People gained the right to vote if they owned at least ¼ part of 
serf-plot. This legislation was not suitable for the Transylvanian real-estate 
structure, and therefore the paid amount of taxes had become the basis of the census 
even back in 1848. This distinct regulation remained in force after 1874, but it was, 
then, shifted towards the minimum of land tax in Hungary. Here, however, the 
amount of paid tax after the former ¼ part of serf-plot was set as the minimum 
value of suffrage. Anyone, who was able to pay that amount of money, gained the 
right to vote, regardless of holding less than the ¼ part of serf-plot. The size of the 
land still did not count in Transylvania. The income was taken as basis for suffrage, 
which adversely affected the Transylvanian peasantry, since peasants, excluding 
Szeklerland, were mainly ethnic Romanians. The Romanian representatives were 
fiercely hostile to the determination of the minimum value of land-tax. Partenie 
Cosma (Parthén Kozma), the Romanian representative of Belényes, accused the 
Minister of Interior of making a nationality issue out of the distribution of 
constituencies and suffrage, however, he added that the Minister did not act in 
accordance with his own convictions, only “in favor of some selfish Transylvanian 
lords, who could only preserve their power by making a national issue out of 
establishing equal rights in Transylvania”.52 According to the remarks of Gheorghe 
Pop de Băşeşţi (György Pap), the affection of the Hungarians for the union was 
understandable. “Even I, as a Romanian politician, do not mind that Transylvania is 
the lynchpin of the Hungarian politics, because this is the land where we all were 
born and as the great Hungarian poet said this is our land ‘from hence you shall not 
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roam’”. Pop requested the assembly to ensure that all measures of the union would 
be enforced thoroughly. The separate legislation of Transylvania was nothing but 
about the restriction of electoral rights of the Romanians to him.53 Vincenţiu Babeş 
(Vince Babes) stressed that he could only express his amazement “that those 
gentlemen who shouted ‘Union or Die’ 26 years ago, now they are arguing for a 
disunion. Now, the Hungarian nobles represent the separation and Romanians stand 
for the union.” In his speech he referred to the ethnic composition of voters and 
according to his statistics, the 93,4% of the population were Romanians but only the 
20% of them gained the right to vote in Alsó-Fehér county. He considered that the 
Minister of Interior only showed solidarity with the Hungarian nobility in the case 
of Transylvania. Pop also stated – which made the assembly laugh – that “an honest 
Hungarian noble cannot make such attempt, only if he forgets as a Minister how to 
be an honest Hungarian noble.54  
According to the compliance of 1908, the impact of the regulation can be seen 
here 




The average of 
tax minimum of 
villages (crown) 
 
The rate of villages 
under the tax 






4 8 0,0% 
North-East Hungarian Ruthen 
region  
0,76 1,6 47,5% 
Upper Hungarian Slovak-
majority region  
1 1,7 19,6% 
East Hungarian Romanian-
majority region  
1,4 1,8 27,9% 
Hungarian-majority region 0,94 4,18 7,9% 
West Hungarian German-
Croat-majority region  
5,62 5,62 0,0% 
Table 2. The regional distribution of the lowest tax minimum of villages in 
190855 
 
In 1908, four crowns were equal to the formerly used eight forints. It shows that 
– except for the wealthiest regions – the minimum amount of taxes that entitled the 
population to elect was much lower in Hungary than in Transylvania. The 
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Transylvanian minimum required census was the least favorable, since there was a 
huge difference between the general regional income and the required minimum.  
During the determination of the electoral right, further restrictions were enacted. 
In the case of intellectuals, the appointed status was specified and required, 
consequently, proving educational qualifications was not enough. The army, 
customs and tax officials, gendarmeries and policemen were excluded from the 
group of voters. That person who was involved in bankruptcy proceedings or who 
did not pay the taxes in the previous year could not exercise the right to vote (this 
regulation lasted until 1899). The impact of the reform was controversial, hence, the 
number of voters did not increase but rather, briefly decrease. During the debate on 
the legislation of electoral law, it was obvious that the extension or restriction of 
suffrage was closely linked to the issue of nationalities, despite that, both the Deák-
party and the center-left politicians denied this connection. Perhaps Count Gábor 
Kemény was the most significant speaker on this issue, who constantly reminded 
the assembly about the unjust Romanian ethnic politics during the years of 
absolutism, when the Transylvanian assembly elected the representatives to the 
Imperial Council in support of the politics of Anton Schmerling.  
 
Electoral geometry, discussion about the distribution of constituencies in 
the new county structure 
The Hungarian administrative division was going through an enormous 
transformation during the mid-1870s. Buda and Pest were officially merged with 
Óbuda (Old Buda), thus creating Budapest. The county structure was also modified 
in 1876. Under the government of Kálmán Tisza, the transformation of the county 
structure was finished and, while doing so, all the special administrative divisions 
(the Szekler and Saxon sees, the Jász and Kun territories) were integrated into a 
single system. By restructuring the administrative system, the government intended 
to strengthen its position against the local autonomies. This reconstruction made the 
modification of constituencies necessary.  
The article on regulation of the distribution of constituencies was discussed by 
the assembly at the end of April 1877. The proposal submitted on 28 April gave a 
strong emphasis to the issues of Transylvanian settlements. This draft would have 
removed the right of independent representation of the following cities: 
Abrudbánya, Csíkszereda, Illyefalva, Hátszeg and Vajdahunyad. The proposal also 
would have reduced the number of representatives from two to one in Szamosújvár, 
Gyulafehérvár and Erzsébetváros. Whilst, Brassó and Nagyszeben would have 
gained two-two seats in the new assembly, and, the number of the mandates of 
Budapest would have increased with two more.56 During the debate, Kálmán Tisza 
justified this modification with the advanced plan of linking smaller settlements 
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with 300 voters – with the exception of Erzsébetváros – to county districts. The 
government refused to raise the number of mandates of cities with the exception of 
the two most significant Saxon settlements, Nagyszaben and Brassó.57 The proposal 
presented by the government was only slightly modified during the discussion. Ede 
Zsedényi spoke out in favor of the independent representation of Abrudbánya and 
Verespatak. He suggested that Kolozs should have transferred its mandate to these 
economically and nationally more significant cities. Zsedényi argued that “the 
residents of these cities (Abrudbány and Verespatak), who are in a close 
relationship with the Hungarian people scattered over the region, have always given 
their votes driven by patriotism”. Kálmán Tisza positively replied to the proposal of 
Zsedényi by claiming that this transfer would not affect the system to a large extent. 
The assembly was entrusted by Tisza to make a decision on the proposal, and after 
the discussion, the amendment was approved.58 Pursuant to Act X. of 1877, 
Csíkszereda, Illyefalva, Kolozs, Hátszeg and Vajdahunyad, which held formerly 
independent representation, became county centers. Brasso and Nagyszeben both 
gained two-two mandates. The disappearing and transforming counties, districts and 
sees adopted the new system, and this setting remained in practice until the last 
election of the Dualist Period in 1910.  
The debates on the suffrage often brought to light the question of the 
nationalities. The system carried some serious anomalies. In Hungary, smaller 
constituencies with less inhabitants were created in nationality territories in contrast 
to Hungarian populated areas, where remarkably more people and voters were 
distributed to one mandate. The ethnic mix of voters did not alter the ethnic mix of 
the inhabitants in the nationality areas of Hungary. The incongruous situation of the 
system arose from the fact that these nationality areas were the most reliable 
constituencies of the government. Therefore, the success of the politics of support 
for the compromise was chiefly built on the votes of nationality voters. The reason 
for that situation is considered to be highly complicated and researchers of the field 
highlight four aspects in general: the open ballot system, the strong Hungarian 
nationalism of the pro-independence opposition, the passive parliamentarian 
participation of the nationality parties and the system-supportive attitude of the 
local elite. Each of these four reasons probably played a determining role in the 
development of this phenomenon.  
The whole distributive system was different in Transylvania, in contrast to the 
Hungarian populated area, which was still the breeding ground for independence 
movement and anti-Dualist partisanship. The census, which was considerably 
higher than in the Hungarian peripheries, supplanted the Romanian voters, so 
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consequently, the political opposition of both the Hungarian and Szekler minorities 
was noticeably lower.  
The above mentioned fragile structure was threatened by the extension of 
suffrage, the transformation of constituencies and the equalization of the number of 
voters behind the mandates. For all these reasons, a significant reform of suffrage 
did not take place in Hungary. The fight for suffrage only became permanent after 
the turn of the century, and gained a special role in internal affairs under the 
Fejérváry-government (1905-1906). The extension of suffrage was closely linked to 
the nationality issue and to the assessment of left-wing worker’s and peasant’s 
movements. The official Hungarian political elite, the politicians of both the 
government party and the opposition parties faced a strong social-political pressure, 
thus, the anachronism of electoral regulations was becoming more and more 
obvious in Europe after the turn of the century. The fear of the dismemberment of 
Hungary and political anarchy, however, tied their hands. The political elite 
experimented with some forms of political mechanism that would ensure the 
leading role of the Hungarian people and, at the same time, make the parliamentary 
politics of the left impossible. One of their fundamental goals was to avoid 
Transylvania slipping into Romanian authority by extending general suffrage. 
However, considering the ethnic conditions, it was bound to fail. In my opinion, the 
Hungarian parliament had been tackling a constant legitimacy issue after the turn of 
the century, since the nationality fraction, along with the socialist and social 
democratic parties, who were practically unable to get into the parliament, 
righteously accounted the legislature for enjoying only the sole support of the 
minority census owners. The parliament, by not using the opportunity of the full 
extension of suffrage, was gradually becoming more and more detached from the 
society. This gap between the parliament and the society became bigger due to the 
Austrian suffrage reform, which granted general suffrage to the population.  
Even during and after the First World War, the negative effects of the legitimacy 
problem had been massively encountered. This legitimacy issue made the 
nationality question genuinely acute, hence the few nationality representatives in 
the parliament questioned (by reference to the legitimacy argument) the existence of 
a representative legislature. The nationality voters, and those nationalities who did 
not have the right to vote, complained that they were constantly pictured as 
dangerous elements to the state. The political system, unfortunately, did not give the 
opportunity to remedy the economic, social and political grievances of the citizens 
of the state.  
 
